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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RONALD L. and SHIRLEY
DIANE BAXTER, husband
and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants;
RIO VISTA OIL, LTD, a
Utah corporation,
An Involuntary Plaintiff,
-vs-

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant and ThirdParty PlaintiffRes pondents,
-vs-

No.

19097

ROBERT REES DANSIE and MARIE
GROW DANSIE, his wife; DAVIS
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; DAVIS
COUNTY ASSESSOR; DAVIS COUNTY
RECORDER; and WEBER COUNTY, a
body politic of the State of
Utah,
Third-Party Defendants

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appl'llants take this appeal from a Summary Judgment entered

-2-

in an action

wherein they seek to quiet title to 6.00 acres of

unimproved real property allegedly located in Davis County, State
of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Summary Judgment was entered in this matter on March 3, 1983,
and Notice of Appeal was filed and entered on March 31, 1983; thereafter, on or about April 8, 1983, respondent prepared and mailed to
counsel for appellants a further document, entitled

Final Order,

wherein title was purportedly quieted in the name of Utah Department
of Transportation as to the real property which is the subject matter
of this litigation and an additional 12-acre
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the Summary Judgment and the Final
Order reversed and set aside and an Order remanding this matter for
trial for the purpose of determining title, as between appellants,
respondent and such other parties as are necessary to a final title
determination, to

the subject lands and such other lands as may be

1. The Final Order does not appear in the Record on Appeal
nor ( as of May 3, 1983) is
a Docket entry or other
evidence of the document in the Weber County Clerk's office.
Respondent's counsel has not advised the writer of this brief
that the Final Order might have been intercepted or never signed
by the Court; accordingly it is set forth in the Appendix for
reference purposes.
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affected by the

true location of the county line between Weber

and Davis counties.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Rule 56 (c) provides that summary judgment shall be rendered
II

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Accordingly, since appellants hereinafter raise an issue on appeal
challenging the procedure followed by respondent in its Motion for
Summary Judgment, the material facts hereinafter set forth will be
restricted to matters set forth in the pleadings

Complaint--

R. 1 and \nswer-- R. 62), the Affidavits of Ronald L. Baxter

R.127)

and Stephen M. Smith ( R. 236), and the admissions of fact-- which
appellants herewith stipulate to-- contained in this Statement.
Appellants brought this action against the Department of
Transportation of the State of Utah to quiet title to 6.00 acres of
unimproved land claimed to be located in Davis County ( R. 1), the
land being valuable primarily as a source of gravel-type materials.
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The Department of Transportation resisted, claiming that it is the
owner of the subject tract because the land is located in Weber
County ( R. 62).
On May 26, 1969 Davis County issued a Tax Deed ( R. 100) to
Thomas Hollberg, Ronald Baxter and Ronald A. Toone, one-third each,
as tenants in common, to 18.00 acres of land in Davis County in the
S.

of the N.

Meridian.

of SW

t

of Sec. 25, 5 N., 1 W., Salt Lake Base and

Thereafter, the purchasers divided the lands, and on
29, 1970,

Baxters

acquired the 6.00 acre tract which is

the subject of this litigation ( R. 116, 117).
On or about August 20, 1975, Johnson Construction Company
entered upon the westerly 6.00 acre tract, which had been previously
conveyed to Ronald A. Toone, and began to excavate and crush gravel
for a road construction job.

Toone then brought action in the Second

District Court of Davis County in September, 1975 against Johnsoa
Construction Company to recover the value of the gravel materials
removed, but he was unsuccessful in the litigation because a jury
held that the Toone tract of land was located in Weber County and,
accordingly, Davis County had no authority to tax the land and to
issue a Tax Deed.

In the Toone case the matter went to the jury

similar Instructions submitted by both parties which, in L·ffect,
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directed the jury to find whether, as of January 4, 1896, the
Weber River was located where it then existed at the time of trial
( and presently exists) or

whether in 1896 the river was located

approximately 1,000 feet farther north, which would have placed it
north of the Toone tract ( R. 143, 145). It was admitted by both
litigants in the Toone case that the location of the Weber River, as
established by law, constituted the boundary line

between the two

counties.
The jury in the Toone case found the location of the Weber
River in 1896 to be its present location, thus placing the Toone
parcel north of the Weber River, and Toone's action against Johnson
Construction Company failed.

Judgment on the Verdict in that action

was entered on January 7, 1977 (R. 45).
At no time during the Toone litigation, or prior thereto

or

at any time since, did Johnson Construction Company attempt to remove
gravel materials from either the Hollberg or Baxter tracts; nevertheless, Johnson Construction Company filed a motion in the Toone case to
join the Hollbergs and Baxters in order

11

•••

to have a complete

adjudication of the ownership of the properties in question.
( R.

4q)

11

kespondent's counsel in this action, Stephen C. Ward,

represented .l>lrnsL>n CLmstcuction Company in the Toone case,
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listing his appearance on all papers in that litigation as
11

Assistant Attorney General"; however, at no time was the Utah

Department of Transportation made a party to the Toone litigation
nor did it seek to become a party. Obviously, since Johnson
Construction Company had taken no materials for which damages would

have been paid from the Hollberg or Baxter properties, they were
not ordered to be made parties in the Toone litigation.
The Baxter tract of land, which lies contiguous to and
immediately east of the Toone tract, was not disturbed until
personnel of the Department of Transportation entered upon the land
in the spring of 1978 and commenced to removal gravel therefrom (R.4).
Accordingly, Baxters filed a Notice of Claim with the Department of
Transportation of the State of Utah on May 10, 1978, as provided
by Section 63-30-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953( as amended, 1965).
In their Notice of Claim they asserted title to the subject tract
and objected to the removal of gravel therefrom.

No response was

made by the Department of Transportation of the State of Utah or
by the Attorney General within the statutory period of one year,
and this action was then brought.
Baxters' Complaint ( R. 1) alleges their ownership to the
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subject 6.00 acres of land derived from and

through the Tax Deed

from Davis County (which originally included 18.00 acres), that
the defendant Department of Transportation claims title to the
property, that they timely filed their Notice of Claim as provided
by statute, that no response was made by defendant Department of
Transportation, and that their title should be quieted against the
Department of Transportation of the State of Utah. The State's
Answer ( although not so designated-- R. 62) contains a general
denial; and it affirmatively asserts, among other things, that the
Davis County tax sale was invalid, that the property is located in
Weber County and

at all times has been taxed by Weber County, that

Davis County had no authority to sell the subject tract at tax
sale and did not follow the proper statutory procedures pertaining to
such sales, that plaintiffs failed to file their claim within the
one-year period provided by Section 63-30- 12 (as amended 1978),
that the Toone case was res judicata and that Baxter should be
collaterally

estopped from bringing this action because he was a

witness in that case.
the Toone case was tried on the basis of the location
of the Weber River as it existed on January 4, 1896, Baxters in this
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action take the position that the Weber River's course has been
substantially altered since the county lines were first established,
and that the river's location on January 10, 1866, as established
by the Territorial laws of the State of Utah and as adopted by the
Constitution of the State of Utah should govern. Based upon this
contention, Baxters maintain that the Weber River in 1866 was located
more than 1,000 feet farther to the north, thus placing their tract
of land in Davis County.
Utah Department of Transportation moved for Summary Judgment
in this case on the grounds that Baxters were judicially barred from
suing to quiet title against the State of Utah because of the
decision in the Toone litigation ( R. 84), claiming that the boundary
line between Weber and Davis counties was finalized in that case and
that judicial notice should be taken of that fact

R. 106), and

that Ronald L. Baxter was further bound by the Toone decision for the
reason that he appeared as a witness in the Toone case. Baxter
countered by Affidavit ( R. 127), asserting

pointedly that his

only

contact with the Toone case was that of an expert witness furnishing
surveying testimony.

Department of Transportation did not counter

Mr. Baxter's Affidavit and did not furnish any other 3dmissible
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evidence concerning that matter.
The Second District Court, Hon. Calvin Gould, Judge, granted
Summary Judgment in favor of defendant Department of Transportation,
and the same was entered on March 3, 1983.

No formal Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of law were entered, but the Court's Memorandum
Decision ( R.

249) held that

(a) Baxters were bound by the decision

in the Toone v_ Johnson Construction Companv case under the doctrine
of collateral estoppel since Ronald L. Baxter

testified as a witness

therein and" ... was interested in its result.", and was therefore
in privity with Toone; that ( b)

the Court

previously found the

Tax Deed from Davis County, of which it took judicial notice, to be
void; and that (c) the Court had finally decided the location of the
boundary line between Weber and Davis counties in the Toone case, of
which it also took judicial notice.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT AND RESPONDENT BOTH FOLLOWED IMPROPER PROCEDURES
IN A SUMMARY JUOCMENT SITUATION.
A motion for summary judgment has been recognized by the courts
as an exlt'nsi"n of a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

By permitting

-10-

either or both

parties to file affidavits and other admissible

evidence or admissions, cases can sometimes be disposed of without
the burden of an unnecessary trial. However, Rule 56 (c) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure limits consideration to

11

the

•••

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, ...

11

The foregoing requisites

were surrnnarized in the matter of In re Williams' Estates, 10 U.2d 83,
348 P. 2d

683, where this court held that --

A surrnnary judgment is
depositions. affidavits
is no issue of material
is entitled to judgment

11

proper only if the pleadings.
and admissions show that there
fact and that the moving party
as a matter of law."

"
without giving plaintiff the opportunity to present
... evidence ( which plaintiff claims she can produce)
in a trial we cannot hold as a matter of law that
plaintiff is not entitled to recover."
Underlining added)
The Record on Appeal in this matter is replete with Memorandum
Briefs filed by respondent wherein carefully excerpted exhibits and
documents from the case of Toone v. Johnson Construction Comoanv
were added to support respondent's position.

Inasmuch as

:1

motiun

for surrnnary judgment is primarily handled bv or::il argument ind
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briefs and documentation, it is not always possible for the
opposing party to raise objections and keep such items completely
out of the Record on Appeal as would be done if the offering of such
items in evidence

were attempted at trial. Nevertheless, appellants

repeatedly objected to the procedure, pointing out that respondent
" ... has carefully sorted out and selected facts peculiar to its own
version of the matter, most of which lack materiality ... "

R. 119),

engendering such retorts from respondent as the following:
" The Plaintiffs neither controverted the stated facts
nor attempted to state any additional facts. It must then
be assumed that the Defendant's statement of facts must
be true."
Also, in oral argument:
"Mr. Ward:

' It is always amazing to me, your Honor, that
when I listen to his side and compare it with
our side, there is no similarity whatsoever ... '

THE COURT:

' That's generally what makes a lawsuit.'

( R.

II

268)

It is not proper for the moving party seeking summary judgment
to reach out and, by way of brief or simple argument, raise matters
which are not properly admitted, nor should the movant attempt to
shift its hurden of proof to the defending party by such tactics.
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The identical Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure

containsseveral annotated cases which advance tLe foregoing
proposition:
"Summary judgment is neither method of avoiding necessity
for proving one's case nor clever procedural gambit
whereby claimant can shift to his adversary his burden of
proof on one or more issues."
U.

S. v.

Dibble, C. A. C3l. 1970, 429 F.

2d 598

Further:
" Admissibility of evidence on motion for summary judgment
is governed by rules of evidence applicable at trial."
Roucher v. Traders

& General

Ins. Co., 235 F. 2d 423

Similarly, in the recent case of Schaer v. Utah Department of
Transportation

( No.

18009, filed January 10, 1983), this Court

quoted from an earlier case, saying:
Upon a motion for summary judgment, the courts ought
to recognize, as a minimum, that the opposing party
produce some evidentiary matter in contradiction of the
movant's case or specify in an affidavit the reason why
he cannot do so."
11

Nor is it sufficient for a lower court to take

11

judicial notice"

of another case in the manner outlined in the Memorandum Decision
on file _herein ( R.

249).

Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Evidecice sets

forth facts which may be judicially noticed bv a trial court, but

-13-

the rule does not specifically include the taking of judicial
notice of the record in another action in another case. At any
rate, Rule 10 provides that the judge " ... afford each party
reasonable opportunity to present to him information relative to
the propriety of taking judicial notice of a matter or to the tenor
of the matter to be noticed."
Under the federal cases interpreting Rule 56 (c) it has been
held
"Grant of a summary judgment would not be sustained on basis
of judicial notice of a court's prior case, where trial court
did not inform parties as to what he noticed, and in his
order granting summary judgment merely stated he referred to
the record in a prior action, but failed to include any
portions of the record of such prior action in his order."
Soley v. Star
390 F. 2d

& Herald Company, C. A. Canal Zone 1968,
364

"Before an action may be summarily dismissed on ground of
res judicata, defense of res judicata must appear from the
face of complaint or the record of the prior case must be
received in evidence."
Guam In•1. Co. v. Central Building, Inc., C.A. Guam 1961,
288 F. 2d 19
46

Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, Sections 599 and 600 cover the

matter at hand:

-14-

"Sec. 599. - Necessity of proof of record.
The question sometimes arises whether it is necessary to
offer or introduce evidence of the record of a prior
judgment set up as a bar or estoppel, or whether it may be
established by judicial notice. Although there is some
authority in support of the rule that a court will take
judicial notice of a judgment previously rendered by it
and sought to be made available as a basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata, at least where such
judgment is referred to in the pleadings, a court ordinarily
will not take judicial notice of a judgment rendered in a
different action; it is generally held that the existence and
contents of a judgment sought_ to be made available as a basis
for the application of the doctrine of res judicata must be
proved by offering the record or a"copy thereof in evidence,
whether the judgment was rendered by the court trying the
principal case, or by another court. It has also been
adjudged that oral testimony of a witness relating to facts
established by a judgment is, under the best evidence rule,
inadmissible where proper objection is made."
"Sec. 60U Necessity of proof of whole record.
Ordinarily, questions as to the effect of judgments as
res judicata cannot be decided from the judgment alone,
but must be determined by the aid of the entire record,
and the general rule is that proof of the whole record
must be introduced where a party intends to avail himself of a judgment as an adjudication on the subject
matter, particularly where it is material to show the
premises and grounds on which the judgment is based, or
the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment.
Under this rule, a judgment entry alone unaccompanied by
any part of the record or an explanation of its absence,
is not admissible in evidence, notwithstanding that it
emanates from a court of general jurisdiction and contains
general recitals of jurisdiction."
( Underlining added\
This Court has adopted the above -quoted r"a s ,,n in g in Li»
of Carter v.Carter (Utah 1977), 563 P.2d 177.

c

1 s,
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The lower court wos insistent that the other Tax Deed
purchasers and Weber County be brought into the litigation (R.160),
but it refused Baxters' motion to join
the Affidavit of Stephen M.

Monroe( R.229),

though

Smith, manager of the real property

department of that company, asserted that Utah Department of
Transportati.> n " ... claims title to ... approximately eight (8)
acres of land belonging to Monroe, Inc.

in the area north of the

Weber River as now located." and that the State of Utah has
" ...

trespassed upon and removed gravel materials from Monroe's lands

in the S.

W.

l

of the SW

l

of said Section 25 which lie north of

the '.Jeber River as now located, without any right whatsoever ... "
( R.

236).
Weber County was served with the Third Party-Complaint, but

the lower court, in the final analysis, disregarded its own order
requiring that Weber County be brought into the action and proceeded
to summary judgment, stat:ng in its Memorandum Decision ( R.
that it " ...

251)

is unfortunate in this case that neither of the subject

counties saw fit to enter this litigation and thus protect their
citizens bv causing the proper determination of a correct boundary."
,\ctu;illv, h'''"'vcr, \,\·hc>r C•untv dulv filed its Answer
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to the Amended Third-Party Complaint ( R.
that respondent's Complaint

11

226), asserting therein

fails to state a cause of action

against defendant Peber County ...
1 through 6 or parts thereof ...

11

11

,

that it denied

11

allegations

of the Complaint, and that the

Third-Party Complaint be dismissed and that Weber County

have

judgment against the Utah Department of Transportation for costs
and attorney's fees incurred in defending the action.
It is highly unusual for a lower court to order the inclusion
of an affected governmental agency into a litigation and then,
as here, proceed to summary judgment and a ruling adverse to the
same governmental agency brought into the action by its own ruling.
The subject property lies south

( on the Davis County side) of

the Interstate Freeway which proceeds east up through Weber

Canyon,

thus making the subject tract physically isolated, in part, from
access by Weber County, and any transfer of ownership to the utah
Department of Transportation certainly eliminates any possibility
that Weber County would receive property taxes from the subject
lands in future years. There is the further matter that open
gravel pit operations create special problems of surveillance, contro:
policing and possible nuisacces, thus making it further prohahlc

tha'
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County would possibly prefer that Davis County should keep the
property within the latter's jurisdiction. At any rate, and

irre-

spective of whatever position Weber County might have ultimately taken
in the proceedings, the lower court should not have proceeded to
summary judgment without considering its position.

Likewise, in order

to properly arrive at a determination of title in the area which
could have been affected by any sudden change of the Weber River
since 1866, Monroe, Inc., and any other owners of similarly situated
tracts of land, should have been brought into the litigation in order
to effect a final determination of titles.
Responrlent's high-grading of the documents and exhibits taken
from the file in the Toone case so as to advance matters favoring
its own position should not be condoned nor allowed to substitute for
the admission into evidence of the entire record.

Further, the argu-

ments set forth in its various Memorandum briefs seeking summary
judgment, being devoid of any affidavits, admissions, stipulations or
other admissible evidence, cannot possibly be upheld by argumentative statements volunteered by counsel for respondent. The lower
court compounded the problem by ordering Weber County into the
1itig:iti m
h,•1rncL1n

5,•

1 i!1•

th.it there c:iuld be a proper determination of the
1·«l\0t'c'11 the• ·:cvL' Ct>unties,

but chose to ignore the
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fact that Weber County complied with the order and did in fact
file its Answer. In short, the mistakes, omissions and
of respondent and the lower court clearly establish such disregard
for the proper rules of procedure in summary judgment situations
as to clearly violate constitutional safeguards of due process of
law. The procedural errors and omissions,

standing alone, should

mandate a remand of this matter.

II.
A PLAINTIFF WHOSE TITLE IS DERIVED IN PART BY SUCCESSION
THROUGH ANOTHER LITIGANT PRIOR IN TIME TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF
RELATED LITIGATION BY HIS GRANTOR, WHOSE ONLY PARTICIPATION OR
INTEREST IN THE LITIGATION INVOLVING HIS GRANTOR WAS THAT OF A
WITNESS FURNISHING EXPERT TESTIMONY, AND WHO HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION
PREDICATED ON A DIFFERENT SET OF MATERIAL FACTS AND A DIFFERENT
LEGAL PREMISE FROM THAT INVOLVED IN THE LITIGATION INVOLVING HIS
GRANTOR, IS NOT BARRED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
FROM PROCEEDING

WITH A SUBSEQUENT ACTION IN HIS OWN BEHALF.

The lower court's Memorandum Decision based its summary
judgment ruling on the generic concept of judicial cstoppel.
Although at times the ruling crosses over from one concept tc)
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another without making its position absolutely clear, it is
difficult to see how summary judgment could be considered in this
case unless mandated by

the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

A preliminary analysis of the Memorandum Decision should make

it abundantly clear that the lower court's reference to " judicial
notice" can only serve this litigation insofar as we might be
concerned with admissible evidence which fits within the confines
of Rule

56(c); likewise,

rules of res judicata

there is no

possibility that the ordinary

can apply because there is not a single identica

property-claimant litigant in either the subject case or the Toone
case.

Proceeding next to the nature of quiet title actions, it would

seem self-evident that no area-wide determination of title, whether
based upon a river boundary or other critical matter,
bind property claimants whose properties
referenced litigation.

could possibly

were not included in the

Such an action should also be clearly labeled

a quiet title action, either in the pleadings or by publication of
notice to landowners who either reside beyond the local jurisdiction
or who cannot otherwise be found or served.
Any lawver working in the field of real property titles, or
an ahslr,1ctc1i- or title insurance exc1miner, would find it really
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amusing to suggest that the Toone litigation could ever affect
title to lands whose owners were not parties or privies to that
litigation.

Section 78-40-1 through 13, Utah Code Annotated,

relating to Quiet Title Actions, details the procedure to be followed
in such actions, and provides the method of service of summons upon
unknown defendants by publication.

Certainly,

a property owner

such as Monroe, Inc., whose property manager filed an Affidavit
( R.

236) asserting that the State of Utah was claiming and using

land which it assertedly owned, would have to be considered a prime
defendant in any quiet title action which the Utah

Department of

Transportation might bring.
As will be pointed out subsequently, the boundary line between
Weber and Davis counties Wa.l'established by the location of the Weber
River on January 10, 1866.

Thus, no final determination of the

physical location of the line could have been made in the Toone
litigation without Weber County having been made a party to it.
See American Mutual Building
117 P.2d

293.

& Loan

Co.

v. Jones, 102 U. 318,

Nor could any court proceed on its own in litigation

between two private litigants and change the boundary line between
two counties since Article XI, Section 3, of the Constitution of
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Utah explicitly

sets forth the procedure to be followed:

Sec. 3. (Changing county lines)
No territory shall be stricken from any county unless a
majority of the voters living in such territory, as well
as of the county to which it is to be annexed, shall
vote therefor, and then only under such conditions as may
be prescribed by general law.
By the simple process of elimination, it remains that the
only judicial bar which could conceivably prevent Baxters from
presenting their case must be premised on the claim that Toone v.
Johnson Construction Company contained the necessary elements of
collateral estoppel. That feature, as it might affect the granting
of summary judgment in this action, will now be addressed.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel requires that the Baxters
bP " in privity" with one of the litigants in the Toone case.
The basic law in Utah is set forth in the case of
v.Searle (Utah 1978), 588 P. 2d 689,

Searle Bros.

where the test of privity

was defined as -'' ... a person so identified in interest with another
that he represents the same legal right. This includes
a mutual or successive relationship to rights in
property. Our Court has said that as applied to
judgments or decrees of court, privity means ' one
whose interest has been legally presented at the time.' "
In setting forth the four tests determinative of whether
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collateral estoppel applies, this Court adopted the California
rule, as follows:
"l. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in
question?
2.

Was there a final judgment on the merits?

3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted
a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication?
In a subsequent opinion, the California Supreme Court
recognized the necessity for a fourth test: ' Was the
issue in the first case competently, fully, and
fairly litigated? ' These four tests have been adopted
by the majority of jurisdictions as the correct standard
to apply ... "
Thus, we concern ourselves with whether Baxters had either
a mutual or successive

relationship to rights in property. These

appellants contend that neither relationship existed.
(A)

Baxters never had a "mutual" relationship in the case

of Toone v. Johnson Construction Company.
The lower court's Memorandum Opinion ( R. 251) recites:
" Plaintiff Baxter appeared in the trial as a witness;
obviously knew its character and object and was
interested in its result.
Plaintiff is, therefore,
estopped from making this challenge to the determination of invalidity of the tax sale and deeJ."
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Similar general statements, which the lower court
apparently accepted, are liberally placed

throughout the various

Memorandum briefs filed in this matter by respondent Department of
Transportation.
Baxters, on the other hand, expressly deny

that either of

them had any tie or interest in the Toone litigation such as would
invoke collateral estoppel.

Except for the admission and stip-

ulation set forth in this brief, there is nothing in this record
on appeal to even show that Ronald L. Baxter was a witness in the
Toone case, let alone being interested in its results.

Respondent

has failed to produce any relevant portion of the record in the
Toone case showing any participation by either of the Baxters therein,
no transcript of the testimony of Ronald L. Baxter in the Toone
case has been introduced, and respondent has failed to support its
assertions concerning Ronald L. Baxter's appearance as a witness in
the Toone case by affidavit or any other credible evidence. Further,
except for the fact that Ronald L. Baxter furnished expert surveying
testimony as a witness in the Toone case, both of these appellants
categoricallv

that either of them were otherwise involved in
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that litigation in any way whatsoever.
Ronald L. Baxter filed his Affidavit in this matter ( R. 127)
wherein he stated:
" 5.
I appeared as an expert witness in the case of
Toone v. LeGrande Johnson Construction Company, et al.,
Civil No. 20915, as referenced in the Motion of the State
of Utah for Summary Judgment; however, my appearance was
solely for the purpose of furnishing survey information
taken from my field notes and old government survey notes
and to establish physical points and boundaries in the
general area, and I took no
in the litigation as
a participant in any way whatsoever and was not represented in the action by legal counsel."
There is nothing in the Record on Appeal in this case beyond
the above-quoted statement from Mr. Baxter's Affidavit which this
Court can consider relative to any "mutual" relationship that either
appellant had with any litigant in the Toone case. Obviously, neither
appellant was legally represented in the Toone litigation nor did
either of them have a legal, economic or other interest in any
possible proceeds of that litigation.

This Court has had occasion to

expand upon the Searle Bros. case in Tanner v.

136 P.2d

Bacon, 103 U. 494,

957:

"It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata
does not operate to affect strangers to a judgment;
that it only affects the parties .:ind their success.irs
in interest, and those who are in privity 1vith :1 p.1rt
thereto...
This court has defined the \vc•rd ' privit
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as a 'mutual or successive relationship to the same
right or property.' As applied to judgments, the word
means one whose interest has been legally represented
at the time."
( Underlining added)
Further, this Court has

also

held that for the " mutual"

relationship to occur there must be identical interests present.
See Glen Allen Mining Co.
296 P. 233.

v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 U.

362,

That Ronald L. Baxter was a stranger to the Toone

litigation is pointed out in 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, Sec. 530:
"530.

.fuo is a stranger; right to intervene.

1

A party to the principal case is regarded as a stranger
to the judgment rendered in the previous action where he
was not directly interested in the subject matter
of, and had no right to make defense, adduce testimony,
cross-examine witnesses, control the proceedings, or
appeal from the judgment, even though he could have made
himself a party to the previous action.
"
These appellants, being non-parties, cannot possibly be bound
by the decision in the Toone case.
As stated in 46 Am. Jur 2d, Judgments, Sec. 532, even if
Baxters might have anticipated a future situation such as that which
involved Mr. Toone, such interest does not constitute privity:
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"Pri vi ty is not established, however, from the me re fact
that persons may happen to be interested in the same
question or in proving or disproving the same state of
facts, or because the question litigated was one which
might affect such other person's liability as a judicial
precedent in a subsequent action. The term ' privity' when
applied to ajudgment or a decree refers to one whose interest
has been legally represented at the trial. ... "
Similarly, the rule is amplified in
Sec.

Section 536:

536. Necessary interest and control in case; amicus

"
It is recognized that the participant's interest in
the outcome of the litigation within the contemplation of
this rule may not be an incidental interest, but must be a
direct interest-- an interest which will be directly and
innnediately affected by the judgment in the case; and such
incidental interest as that the decision may in another,
disconnected litigation, pending or contemplated, be used
as a precedent in favor of the participant, is not sufficient
to call into operation the application of the rule. On the
same principle, participation at amicus curiae is not sufficient
to put the rule into operation."
The mere appearance as an expert witness in another case is
clearly insufficient to create the " mutual" relationship necessary
to invoke collateral estoppel against appellant Ronald L. Baxter.
Nor, for that matter, can the appearance as a witness in a case
possibly raise collateral estoppel against appellant Shirley Diane
Baxter, his wife, since she, too, did not actively participate or
have an interest in the Toone litigation and, further, Cto.h Lrn
no longer ties a woman's rights and liabilities to those of her
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husband simply by reason of the marital relationship.
Richards v. Hodson, 26 U.
(B)

See

2d 113, 485 P. 2d 1044.

Baxters never had a " successive" relationship in the

case of Toone v. Johnson Construction Company.
The lower court and respondent both placed heavy emphasis
upon the fact that both Baxters and Toone acquired their holdings
through the 1969 Tax Deed from Davis County ( R.
followed

250), but both

an erroneous line of reasoning inasmuch as a conunon

source of title simply does not constitute " successive " interests
within the concept of collateral estoppel.

There is absolutely no

issue in this litigation as to the fact that Hollberg, Toone and
Baxters divided the larger tract and took separate deeds to separate
6-acre tracts some five years prior to the suit brought by Toone
against Johnson Construction Company.

It is just that 5-year time

span which completely destroys any " successive" relationship between Toone and Baxters since collateral estoppel cannot reach
backwards in the chain of title to a conunon source, and then proceed forward into another property owner. The

was

explained in the previously quoted case of Searle Bros.

v.Searle,

wherein this Court stnted:
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11
The property interest arose before the commencement
of the first action, not subsequent thereto, so that
appellants cannot be regarded as in privity and subject
11
to the judgment rendered therein.

Collateral estoppel as between grantor and grantee will not
run against the grantee ( here, Baxters) unless the estoppel arose
prior to and was in existence at the time of the grant.
28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver, Sec. 117.

See

Obviously, a

contrary rule would create havoc with land titles and rights in land
since every landowner would live in fear that his title might be
impaired or destroyed

through litigation involving another securing

title subsequent in time to a conveyance from the source of title
common to both.
46

.\m. Jur., Judgments, Sections 532 and 533 stresses the

necessity that title or interest must be acquired subsequent to the
judgment in order to create the " successive" interest establishing
privity:
"Sec. 532. Persons included as privies .
. . . Under this rule, privity denotes mutual or successive
relationship to the same right of property, so that a
privy is one who, after the commencement of the action has
acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by' the
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judgment through or under one of the parties, as by
inheritance, succession, purchase, or assignment. There
is privity within the meaning of the doctrine of res
judicata where there is an identity of interest and
privity in estate, so that a judgment is binding as to
a subsequent grantee, or lienor of property.
''
"Section 533.

Necessity of subsequent acquisition of interest.

In the absence of the applicability of a statutory provision
requiring a different result, the general rule is that
although one to whom an assignment is made or property
granted by a party to an action during the pendency
thereof is regarded as in privity with such party within the
meaning of the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment is
regarded as conclusive only as between the parties and
their successors in interest by title acquired subsequently to the commencement of the action, so that a
person to whom a party to an action has made an assignment
or granted property or an interest therein before the
commencement of the action is not regarded as in privity
with the assignor or grantor so as to be affected by a
judgment rendered against the assignor or grantor in the
subsequent action.
"Ordinarily, a grantee is in privity with his grantor and
entitled to the benefits of judgments entered in favor of
the grantor only if the judgments were prior to the conveyance of the property .... "
( Underlining added )
Baxters' title, having arisen more than seven years prior to
the date uf the Toone trial, is in no way a " successive" interest;
ace 'rdi,-i"l\',

privit\• sinipl:; c.mnot possibly exist in the circumstances.
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(C) The issue in the subject action is not " identical"
with the issue tried in the

case of Toone v. Johnson

Construction Company.
Two of the four tests set forth in the case

Searle Bros. v.

Searle, insofar as they apply to the matter at hand, are rather
closely related. Not only must privity be established for collateral
estoppel to apply, but it must appear that (1) the issue decided
in the prior adjudication must be " identical" with that presented
in the subject action and (4) the issue actually litigated in the
first case

have been competently, fully and fairly litigated.

Both litigants in the Toone case submitted requested jury
instructions tying the location of the boundary between Weber and
Davis counties to the statehood date of January 4, 1396, and the
court so instructed the jury. Unfortunately, the Allen Smith
Company, publishers of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, did not furnish
cross-references or annotations for Article XI, Section 1, of the
Constitution of the State of Utah or Sections 17-1-9 and 32
( defining the boundary line between Davis and Weber counties)
beyond a point of time determined from Revised Statutes of Utah of

1898, and this omission 1,·as the cause of,

'r .1t lc>;:ist a Cllntrihuti:1_
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factor to, the use of an improper date to establish the true
boundary line between the two counties.

It was only sometime after

the conclusion of the Toone trial and the entry of judgment that
an analysis of the evidence in that case revealed the existence
of old Javis County

plat maps and taxing history which could not

be reconciled with some of the evidence introduced at that trial.
A subsequent detailed examination of older Utah statutes provided
the answer.
The Constitution of the State of Utah adopted the then existing
counties:
"ARTICLE XI. COUNTIES, CITIES AND TOWNS
Section 1.

Existing counties, precincts, and school
districts recognized.)

"The several counties of the Territory of Utah, existing
at the tjme of the adogtion of this Constitution, are
hereby recognized as legal subdivisions of this State,
and the precincts, and school districts, now existing
in said counties, as legal subdivisions thereof, and
they shall so continue until changed by law in pursuance
of this article.
( Underlining added )
The boundaries of the counties of Utah which were " ...
L'Xisting at the· tim<= of the adoption of
\vLT<·

( the) Constitution ... "

ciL.ic1llv dt·Cinc·d in Sccticms 156 and 157 of the Compiled
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Laws of

Utah of 1876.

Thus, unless contiguous county lines were

changed by a majority vote as provided in Section 3 of Article XI,
the original county lines cannot be changed.

Further, the various

statutory provisions relating to the bounciaries between counties as
have been adopted over the years-- and usually with different
sections and titles-- cannot alter the January 10, 1866 boundary
because to do so would constitute an unconstitutional act.
County v. Rich County, 63 U.

194, 224

Summit

P. 653. As a matter of fact,

the location of the Weber River in the affected area constituted the
boundary between the two counties as of January 10, 1866, and no
constitutional change has been made, nor has any statutory change
been made or attempted.
In the case of Schaer v.

State of Utah, by and through the

Utah Department of Transportation, previously cited, this court
noted that collateral estoppel will not apply-- even if privity is
present-- where there is a different issue to be litigated:
The issues in the present case focus on whether the
first and fourth tests are satisfied. 'h:e ( must, therefore) determine whether the issues actually litigated
in the first action are preciselv the some as those
raised in the present action. ' \./i.ld(J v. '.'iicl-Ct'nturv
Insurance Co., l'tah 635 P.'.'.d .'.+17, 41:• 1 1 1 61, 1 c'.Tlpi1asi.s
11
added).
11

1
•
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The general rule enunciated in similar situations, even when
applicable to the same parties in two litigated cases, is that
res judicata ( and, obviously, collateral estoppel) does not apply
where the result of the first trial resulted from an erroneous
proposition of law.
Sec. 416.

46 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 416 states the rule:

Issues of law.

There are cases stating that the doctrine precluding
the relitigation of issues previously adjudicated in an
action on a different cause of action, is confined to
issues of fact or, at least, to mixed questions of fact
or law, and thereby excluding questions of law from the
operation of the doctrine. Under the rule, the doctrine
does not extend to erroneous propositions of law applied
by the court in reaching its decision. Where, for example,
a court in deciding a case has enunciated a rule of law,
the parties in a subsequent action upon a different demand
are not estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise,
merely because the parties are the same in both cases.
•••
As to questions of law, ... the rule supported by the
American Law Institute Restatement
is that where a question
of law essential to the judgment is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final personal judgment, the
determination is not conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of action, except where
both causes of action arose out of the same subject matter
or transaction; and in any event it is not conclusive if
injustice would result. 11
11

It would constitute an unusual and unjust rule of law to hold
th;it E::ixt,·rs sl«mlc! he hound bv

,Jn

erroneous rule of law adopted in the
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Toone case, particularly under circumstances where they had
absolutely no ability or authority to control that litigation.
Again, and for an entirely different reason, collateral estoppel
cannot and does not apply in the situation before this Court.

SUMMARY
The Utah Department of Transportation is attempting to
quiet title in itself in and to the entire 18.00 acres of land sold
at tax sale by Davis County without ever going to trial and putting
on evidence to support its title. In the subject action, which
involves 6.00 acres, its Third-Party Complaint has attempted
( Appendix a-c) to quiet title to the entire 18.00 acres. Although
Mr. Ward appeared as attorney for Johnson Construction Company in
the case brought by Toone, listing his appearance as "Assistant
Attorney General", he made no attempt to include the State of Utah
as a party to that litigation. We can ask why respondent chose to
remain in the shadows in that case-- and the answer appears rather
obvious.
In seeking to quiet title to the larger 18.00 acre-tract of
which the subject parcel is a portion, respondent nth

t'''
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appearance of Weber County in the case and fails to submit
admissible evidence before any trial court, in clear contravention
of the statutory rules of procedure applicable

to those who seek to

quiet title to real property. The Department of Transportation
apparently takes the position that it need not comply with Section
78-40-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
"Section 78-40-13. Judgment on default-- Court must
require evidence-- Conclusiveness of judgment.-When the summons has been served and the time for
answering has expired, the court shall proceed to
hear the cause as in other cases, and shall have
jurisdiction to examine into and.determine the
legality of the plaintiff's title and of the title and
claims of all the defendants and of all unknown
persons, and to that end must not enter any judgment
by default against unknown defendants, but must
in all cases require evidence of plaintiff's title
and possession and hear such evidence as may be
offergd respecting the claims and title of any of
the cefendants, and must thereafter enter judgmEnt
in accordcir.ce with the evidence and the law. The
shall be conclusivE against all the persons
named in the summons and complaint who have been
served and against all such unknown persons as
stated in the complaint and summons who have been
served by publication."
( Underlining added)
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CONCLUSION
The Summary Judgment should be reversed and set aside, and this
matter should be remanded for trial on the issue of the location of
the Weber River as of January 10, 1866 and such other legal and
factual matters as may be necessary to determine real property
titles and boundaries among plaintiffs Baxters, defendant Department
of Transportation, Weber County, Davis County and such other real
property owners whose titles might be affected by any substantial
change in the course of the Weber River subsequent to January 10,
1866.
Respectfully submitted.

GLEN E. FULLER
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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Appendix p. a

It appearing to the Court and the Court now finds that
heretofore, on the 3rd day of March, 1983, this Court made
and entered its Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendant
and Third-Party Plaintiff, Utah Department of Transportation
in the above-entitled proceeding, and said Summary Judgment
is hereby referred to; and
It appearing to the Court and the Court now finds that
pursuant to the law and the said Judgment,
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
parcel of property hereinafter described:
S 1/2 of N 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of Section
25, 5 N., 1 w., S.L.M. containing 18
acres.
is hereby quieted in the name of the Utah Department of
Transportation and is located in Weber County.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a copy
of this Final Order be filed with the County Recorder of
Weber and Davis County, State of Utah.
DATED this

day of April, 1983.
BY THE COURT:

CALVIN GOULD, D1str1ct Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that a copy of the Final Order
was mailed, postage prepaid, to Glen E. Fuller, 678 East
South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, Rodney S. Page,
Davis County Attorney, Davis County Courthouse, Farmington,
Utah 84025, and Donald C. Hughes, Jr., Weber County Attorney,
Weber County Courthouse, Ogden, Utah 84401, this

?{

day of April, 1983.
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